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Abstract 
Cyber-attacks can occur at machine speeds that are far too 
fast for human-in-the-loop (or sometimes on-the-loop) deci-
sion making to be a viable option. Although human inputs are 
still important, a defensive Artificial Intelligence (AI) system 
must have considerable autonomy in these circumstances. 
When the AI system is model-based, its behavior responses 
can be aligned with risk-aware cost/benefit tradeoffs that are 
defined by user-supplied preferences that capture the key as-
pects of how human operators understand the system, the ad-
versary and the mission. This paper describes an approach to 
automated cyber response that is designed along these lines. 
We combine a simulation of the system to be defended with 
an anytime online planner to solve cyber defense problems 
characterized as partially observable Markov decision prob-
lems (POMDPs). 
 Introduction   
Cyber analysts are faced with a daunting set of challenges 
as they try to craft responses to increasingly sophisticated 
cyber-attacks. Typically, analysts are overloaded with too 
many diverse and noisy alerts to process, making it difficult 
for them to adequately assess the cyber situation. This 
means they often must rely on incomplete and uncertain in-
formation as a starting point for making decisions about how 
to act. It also means that analysts can struggle to find coher-
ent response sequences that address the broad spectrum of 
alerts received. In order to trace suspicious events to a root 
cause, it is often necessary to correlate information across 
multiple event streams and over multiple temporal windows. 
Moreover, analysts often don’t understand the implication 
of their actions in terms of mission success or failure for the 
system being defended. This is all complicated by the fact 
that a timely response can be problematic when attacks oc-
cur at machine speeds. Much of what occurs today relies on 
pre-determined responses to contingencies, seat-of-the-
 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Public Release 
Case Number 19-3530. ©2019 The MITRE Corporation. ALL 
RIGHTS RESERVED. 
pants decisions, and sometimes knee-jerk reactions that may 
result in response actions that are worse than the attack it-
self. 
Many applications of AI to cyber security problems are 
focused on helping analysts manage these challenges. There 
is a case to be made, though, that even with AI support, cur-
rent approaches to cyber security might be overwhelmed by 
a new generation of AI-enabled attacks. Future cyber-at-
tackers are likely to increasingly exploit advances in AI to 
achieve faster, stealthier, and more effective operational ef-
fects. Many of these effects will be achieved at a speed and 
scale that makes a human-in-the-loop defense paradigm un-
likely to be effective. Consequently, future systems will 
have to rely to some extent on automated reasoning and au-
tomated responses – with humans on the loop or out of the 
loop – to ensure mission success and continuously adapt to 
an evolving adversary.  
If AI takes on more responsibility for reasoning and re-
sponse in cyber defense, what are the implications for hu-
man-machine teaming? One clear implication is that AI can-
not be viewed as just a tool applied by human operators to 
make cyber problems more tractable. AI becomes an agent 
that acts with human partners and on their partners behalf. 
If this partnership is going to succeed, humans must be com-
fortable that the AI agent will help achieve their goals in sit-
uations where the system mission is at risk, even under un-
certainty. The underlying issues here are dependability and 
building trust.  
Three attributes of an automated agent are particularly 
important regarding these issues (Lee & See, 2004): pur-
pose, process, and performance. Purpose refers to the de-
signer’s intentions in building the system and the degree to 
which the system is being used in accordance with those in-
tentions. Process refers to an understanding of the factors 
(rules, control laws, algorithms, etc.) that govern system 
 
behavior. Performance refers to the demonstrated ability to 
achieve desirable goals (competence, reliability, predictabil-
ity, etc.). 
This paper describes an approach to automating cyber re-
sponse that is designed with these attributes in mind. We 
start with the premise that, from an AI perspective, it is ad-
vantageous to frame the cyber response problem as a se-
quential decision-making problem under certainty. This 
leads naturally to using decision-theoretic approaches to 
represent the way a human operator understands the system, 
the adversary, and the mission; and generate responses that 
are aligned with risk-aware cost/benefit tradeoffs defined by 
user-supplied preferences. The result is an automated AI 
agent that is well-suited to fill the role of a dependable and 
trustworthy partner for human operators.  
Managing Uncertainty in Cyber Defense 
As we have defined it, automated reasoning about cyber re-
sponses is essentially decision-making based on the projec-
tion of possible futures from a current situation. Viewed as 
a form of game-playing, this involves sequential decision 
making where the defender and attacker are each afforded 
an opportunity to make a move or do nothing (a “no opera-
tions” or NOP).  The complication in cyberspace, however, 
is that information about the current system state and future 
projections or attacker actions are highly uncertain.  
One way to account for these issues is to address the cyber 
response problem directly as a partially observable stochas-
tic game (e.g. as a partially observable competitive Markov 
decision process (Zonouz, et al., 2014)). However, suitable 
state-of-the-art solution techniques are only capable of solv-
ing relatively small games that must be fully specified in ad-
vance. Moreover, while optimal solutions – when tractable 
– compute the Nash equilibrium that specifies optimal poli-
cies for both the attacker and defender, these policies are 
conservative in the sense that they do not necessarily exploit 
opponent weaknesses. It is not clear that this kind of con-
servative strategy is always the most effective approach to 
responding to a cyber attack. 
One alternative to a game-theoretic solution is to focus on 
resolving the defender’s uncertainty about how to respond, 
rather than trying to solve the complete stochastic game. 
When the opponent’s policy is fixed (either known or esti-
mated from data), we can model a partially observable sto-
chastic game as a partially observable Markov decision 
problem (POMDP) from the perspective of the protagonist 
(Oliehoek, et al., 2005). The adversarial aspects of the sto-
chastic game are incorporated into the transition function of 
the POMDP. This is an attractive option because recent ad-
vances in POMDP solution techniques make it possible to 
solve large-scale POMDPs in real time. Additionally, 
POMDP solvers can find policies that exploit opponent 
weaknesses. For these reasons, our research tackles the 
cyber response challenges using the formal framework of 
partially observable Markov decision problems. Note that 
the POMDP approach can compute the kind of general-pur-
pose conservative solution one would expect from a game-
theoretic approach if we formulate the POMDP to assume a 
robust adversary like a min-max opponent. 
Partially observable Markov decision problems 
Formally, a POMDP can be expressed as a tuple (S, A, Z, T, 
O, R) where S is a set of states, A is a set of actions, Z is a 
set of observations, T(s, a, s’) is a transition function giving 
the probability p(s’ | s, a) of transitioning to state s’ when 
the agent takes action a in state s, O(s, a, z) is an observation 
function giving the probability p(z | s, a) of observing z if 
the agent takes action a and ends in state s, and R(s, a) is a 
reward function giving the immediate reward for taking ac-
tion a in state s. The goal of the decision maker is to max-
imize the expected reward accrued over a sequence of ac-
tions. A solution to the decision problem is an optimal pol-
icy that specifies a mapping from states to actions which can 
be used to guide action choices and achieve the maximum 
expected total reward. Since the states in a POMDP are not 
fully observable, the only basis for decision making is the 
sequence of prior actions and subsequent observations. A 
sufficient statistic summarizing the probability of being in a 
particular state, given a history of actions and observations, 
is called a belief, and a probability distribution over all states 
is called a belief state. Solving a POMDP is a planning prob-
lem that involves finding a policy which maps belief states 
to actions. 
Clearly, any search involving probabilistic belief states 
and arbitrarily long histories of actions and observations 
quickly becomes computationally intractable (Pineau, et al., 
2003) because of  the “curse of dimensionality” and the 
“curse of history”. POMDP algorithms typically mitigate 
these concerns by avoiding exact representations of the be-
lief space and working instead with samples from the belief 
space to compute good approximate solutions. For example, 
many algorithms compute solutions by estimating the opti-
mal value function associated with the optimal policy. The 
value function for a policy provides an estimate of the re-
ward expected from executing the policy from a given belief 
state. Value iteration techniques have long been relied on to 
efficiently compute these value functions for POMDPs 
(Cassandra, et al., 1994) and they provide the basis for a va-
riety of offline solution methods that compute a value func-
tion over the entire belief space before taking an action. The 
best current exemplar of this approach is probably the SAR-
SOP (Kurniawati, et al., 2008) algorithm, which can find 
good solutions to POMDPs having up to 10,000 states in a 
practical amount of time. 
Although state-of-the-art offline methods for solving 
POMDPs have made great strides, they are not yet powerful 
enough to address the challenges of real-world cyber re-
sponse problems. Fortunately, there are approaches availa-
ble to (sometimes approximately) solve POMDPs online in 
real time that appear to be suitable for our purposes. 
Online planning for solving POMDPs 
An alternative to offline planning is to select actions online, 
one at a time, using a fixed-horizon forward search (Ross, et 
al., 2008) (He, et al., 2011). Here, the key to making this 
idea effective for real-world problems relies on sampling the 
belief space, rather than fully exploring it. In particular, 
great efficiencies can be achieved by using a black-box sim-
ulator of the POMDP in conjunction with sampling. The 
partially observable Monte-Carlo planning (POMCP) (Sil-
ver & Veness, 2010) algorithm uses a Monte Carlo tree 
search with weighted rollouts to sample belief states and 
state transitions in the belief tree  (thereby mitigating the 
curse of dimensionality), along with a black box simulator 
of the POMDP to estimate the potential for long-term re-
ward (thereby mitigating the curse of history). Belief states 
are efficiently approximated and updated using particle fil-
ters. POMCP was the first general purpose planner to show 
how POMDPs with state spaces as large as 1056 could be 
solved with only a few seconds of computation. The algo-
rithm provably converges to the optimal value function of 
the POMDP if the beliefs updated from the Monte Carlo 
samples accurately reflect the action/observation history. 
While the POMCP algorithm can achieve impressive re-
sults on some large POMDPs, the extremely poor worst-
case behavior of its lookahead search makes it a questiona-
ble choice for cyber security problems. The DESPOT algo-
rithm (Ye, et al., 2017) is an anytime online algorithm for 
POMDP planning that avoids the worst-case behavior of 
POMCP. Rather than using weighted Monte Carlo rollouts 
to sample a belief tree, the idea is to generate a randomized 
but systematically extracted sparse subtree of the belief tree. 
This sparsely sampled belief tree is called a DESPOT (De-
terminized Sparse Partially Observable Tree).  A DESPOT 
captures the performance of policies over a random but lim-
ited sample of “scenarios” by including all possible action 
branches in the corresponding belief tree but only including 
those observation branches that occur in a sampled scenario. 
The DESPOT is constructed incrementally using heuristic 
search with branch and bound pruning, expanding the tree 
selectively in the most heuristically promising direction on 
each step. Theoretical results show that, given a suitable 
number of scenarios to work with, the DESPOT algorithm 
can reliably find near optimal policies with a regret bound 
that depends on the size of the optimal policy. This approach 
has been successfully applied to compute real-time solutions 
to complex POMDP planning problems for autonomous ve-
hicles. Its performance characteristics, and its characteristics 
as a decision-theoretic planner (Boutilier, et al., 1999), make 
it a good choice as the starting point for building a POMDP 
planner to address cyber security problems. 
A simple cyber defense scenario and POMDP 
To allow us to systematically explore solutions to the cyber 
security problems we describe, we have formulated the fol-
lowing notional scenario. 
In Figure 1, we show a small micro network containing 
an attacker start point, and two target nodes (t1, t2) that can 
be compromised to cause mission impact, each with a mid-
dle node (m1, m2) separating the attacker from the target. 
While operating the network, the defender obtains intrinsic 
rewards for every time step that doesn’t involve a compro-
mised target host. When an attacker compromises a target 
host, it causes an adverse mission impact for the defender. 
The defender is provided a set of sensors that make it possi-
ble (at times imperfectly) to assess system state and detect 
attacker actions. Additionally, the defender is provided a set 
of response actions which can be used to restore aspects of 
the system to an uncompromised state. Each of these re-
sponse actions have an associated cost to employ. 
 
 
With this definition of the problem as a starting point, we 
construct a POMDP specification for the defender’s deci-
sions regarding an instance of our micro-network as follows. 
There are 4 nodes in the network, and each node can either 
be compromised or uncompromised. Thus, the network state 
can be represented as a 4-bit binary string with a “1” in a 
specific bit designating that the corresponding node is com-
promised, and a “0” in that bit designating that the node is 
uncompromised. Any state containing a target that has been 
compromised is considered a terminal state. 
There is a single IDS sensor reporting the state associated 
with each node, and we assume they report the binary status 
of a node as “good” or “bad”. These sensors operate inde-
pendently, are reset after each attacker move, and are char-
acterized by a false negative rate and a false positive rate. 
Figure 1 - Simplified micro-network 
Observations for the defender are 4-bit binary strings show-
ing the (possibly erroneous) sensor returns. 
In this scenario, there are four defender actions, consist-
ing of two targeted actions (Rm1 - reset m1; Rm2 - reset m2), 
one global action (RA - reset all hosts), and the option to do 
nothing (NOP). These actions are somewhat deliberately se-
lected such that, Rm(1 or 2) represents a targeted surgical 
response that works well when sensors can identify the hosts 
that have been compromised, while RA is a useful failsafe 
response that can reset the whole system to a safe state even 
when we have sensors that are unable to detect when hosts 
are compromised. Note, as is analogous to reconstituting a 
real computer to a known good state, every action which re-
sets a node also blocks access to that node for the attacker 
during that stage of the game. This means, for example, that 
if the attacker has compromised m1 and is preparing to use 
it as a starting point to attack t1, as long as actions Rm1 or 
RA are started before the attack can complete, they will foil 
the pending attack and the attacker must start over again 
from the beginning. 
The reward function is given by a set of utilities which 
were chosen, somewhat arbitrarily, to characterize potential 
tradeoffs between the defender actions for this network. The 
defender gains 10 points for every game step in a non-ter-
minal state, loses 800 points for entering a terminal state, 
loses 30 points for performing actions Rm1 or Rm2, and 
loses 50 points for performing action RA. We assume the 
attacker scores the game the same way the defender does 
(i.e., a zero-sum game) and the cost of performing attacker 
actions does not currently factor into the total score. 
Despite its simplicity, this micro network provides a use-
ful starting point for assessing automated response solutions 
since it incorporates multi-stage attacks, probabilistic ac-
tions, and uncertain sensing. One example of the kind of in-
vestigation that is instructive involves sensor noise. 
 
 
 
1 We computed the optimal policy using the SARSOP algorithm 
(Kurniawati, et al., 2008). 
2 CSG defines individual incident risk as the product of the probability that 
a cyber incident will occur (i.e., compromises) and the expected loss 
 
The optimal policies for some scenarios involving small 
amounts of sensor noise can be surprisingly complex. In the 
case of an attacker who uses a greedy strategy, this becomes 
especially prevalent when different kinds of sensor noise are 
mixed together, or when sensor noise is combined with un-
certainty about when the attacker will make a move. The 
subtleties of such complex decisions are likely beyond the 
capabilities of a human decision maker who is forced to 
make a hurried decision. 
Figure 2 shows the policy graph for an example involving 
a relatively small (0.1) false positive rate together with a 
somewhat large probability (0.9) that the attacker will 
choose the NIL action and hence the defender can wait to 
make an overt response. A policy graph (Cassandra, et al., 
1994)  summarizes the action choices made by the optimal 
policy. Each node corresponds to a distinct belief state and 
shows the system state having the greatest belief, along with 
its belief value, and the associated optimal action. Outgoing 
edges indicate expected observations, along with their prob-
ability. The policy graph in Figure 2 shows how the optimal1 
policy for this problem instance resolves the uncertainty 
about several contingencies. Note, in particular, the long 
chain of nodes in the middle that address the possibility that 
repeated false positive errors could hide the presence of a 
compromised asset. This is one of the more straightforward 
examples of the complexities we have found in solutions to 
our simplified cyber security problem (Musman, et al., 
2019). Some solutions involve policy graphs having over 
100,000 nodes and more than 300,000 edges. 
Modeling the Cyber Terrain and Attacker Behav-
ior in CSG 
In our approach, the black box simulator needed in conjunc-
tion with the online planning paradigm is provided by the 
Cyber Security Game (CSG) (Musman & Turner, 2018). 
CSG provides a coarse-grained simulation of attacker and 
defender interactions in cyberspace. 
The original implementation of CSG focused on as-
sessing defensive architectures and the deployment of static 
cyber defenses. CSG’s cyber mission impact assessment 
(CMIA) model (Musman, et al., 2010) (Musman & Temin, 
2015) quantifies the consequences (expected loss) in the risk 
equation2. The probability of compromise used in the risk 
equation is approximated by computing the difficulty of 
traversing pathways through the cyber terrain from attacker 
footholds. Defensive decisions are assessed by running a 
simulated attacker against defender option combinations to 
determine if the risk scores have been reduced. In the 
incurred from the incident (i.e., consequences). CSG then defines the total 
system risk as the summation of all the incident risks associated with the 
possible set of incidents that an attacker can cause. 
Figure 2 - Policy graph for a problem instance with false posi-
tive errors and long attacker dwell times 
original version of CSG, the attacker is assumed to be om-
nipotent, having a full knowledge of the target network. 
Hence for each CSG move pair, the computed risk score is 
based on the attacker following a min-max strategy to cause 
the worst impacts, using the best attack pathways to reach 
the assets that cause impacts. 
CSG’s defensive cyber decision making focuses primar-
ily on defending the mission that the cyber assets are in-
tended to support. This mission focus helps reduce the scope 
of the cyber defender’s problem since often only a subset of 
the cyber assets is relevant at any given time. CSG uses a 
CMIA model to translate the occurrence of incidents in cy-
berspace into mission outcome impacts (whether they be 
functional loss, financial loss, loss of reputation, loss of life, 
etc.). In a CMIA model, cyber assets are treated like any 
other organizational resource that exists to support mission 
related activities. Activities that depend on cyber assets are 
typically assumed to be performed correctly unless the cyber 
assets have been affected by some cyber compromise. 
A challenge in cybersecurity is to be able to comprehen-
sively consider the potential impacts of what is a staggering 
number of exploits and cyberattack methods (e.g., CVE has 
over 80,000 entries and CAPEC enumerates over 500 cyber 
attack patterns (MITRE Corporation, 2013)). To avoid hav-
ing to reason about every possible attack instance, CSG’s 
approach is to reason about the effects of successful attacks, 
rather than the attack instances themselves. 
The effects of cyber compromises are represented by the 
set of incident effects in the DIMFUI (Temin & Musman, 
2010) taxonomy. These effects are defined in Table 1. The 
DIMFUI effects were chosen to provide a robust represen-
tation of cyber incidents. Every successful cyber compro-
mise that exists in CVE, and which is described by a CAPEC 
attack pattern, can be represented by one or more DIMFUI 
effects against one or more cyber assets in a system. More 
recently, the MITRE ATT&CK (MITRE Corporation, 
2019) framework has provided a more operational mapping 
of the techniques used by malicious cyber actors. From a 
DIMFUI perspective, many of the techniques listed in 
ATT&CK belong to the category of unauthorized use in 
terms of asset compromise, lateral movement within a com-
promised network, and privilege escalation. Of the DIMFUI 
incident effects, degradation is the only one that involves a 
range of values and that range is something that must be un-
derstood specifically in terms of the type of cyber asset (e.g., 
communications channel, CPU, data) and the mission it sup-
ports. All of the other DIMFUI effects represent the binary 
states of an ICT asset. A cyber adversary is either able to 
modify a cyber asset or they are not. An ICT asset is opera-
tionally available, or it is not; a component or piece of data 
has been fabricated, or it has not, etc. This makes DIMFUI 
a useful abstraction that allows a cyber defender to reason 
only about the impact of 6 DIMFUI incident effects, rather 
than 100’s or thousands of attack instances.  
From a security monitoring perspective, because the 
CMIA model captures which types of incident effects cause 
mission impacts, there is an opportunity to make security 
instrumentation more precise and targeted. For example, if 
it is known that information must be available, the availabil-
ity status of the information asset can be monitored. If it is 
known that information has integrity requirements, then 
substantiated integrity techniques enable the integrity of the 
asset to be monitored. This provides significant context to 
understand which security events are relevant and related to 
impact situations. 
CSG relies on models of the cyber terrain, mission im-
pact, attacker, and defender capabilities. A typical cyber 
model used in CSG (shown in Figure 3) consists of net-
works, network components (i.e. switches, routers, fire-
walls), hosts on the networks, user groups having access to 
the hosts, peripherals, applications, services and interactors 
that run on the host, and information used in the performing 
mission function. We refer to the system topology model as 
a cyber terrain model, since it contains trust and access rela-
tionships in addition to physical connectivity. The existence 
of user groups, that may have access to multiple assets in the 
network, provides a way to simulate how compromised user 
credentials can be used to access hosts. 
 
Table 1 - The DIMFUI taxonomy 
DIMFUI Explanation Typical Attacks 
Degradation 1. Reduction in performance 
or capacity of an IT system 
2. Reduction in bandwidth of a 
communication medium 
3. Reduction in data quality 
4. Limited-effect DoS 
5. Zombie processes using up CPU 
and slowing server 
6. Transfer of non-mission related 
data over a link that slows the 
transfer of mission data 
7. Dropped packets cause an image 
to have less resolution 
Interruption IT asset becomes unusable or 
unavailable 
1. Ping of Death 
2. Wireless Jamming 
3. Wipe disk 
Modification Modify data, protocol, software, 
firmware, component 
1. Change or corrupt data 
2. Modify access controls 
3. Modify/Replace system files 
Fabrication Attacker inserts information into a 
system or fakes components 
1. Replay attacks 
2. DB data additions 
3. Counterfeit software/ components 
Unauthorized 
Use 
Attacker uses system resources for 
illegitimate purposes.  Related and 
often a precondition for other 
DIMFUI. 
1. Access account or raise privileges 
in order to 
modify/degrade/interrupt the OS 
2. Subvert service to spawn a 
program on remote machine 
3. Bandwidth used surfing for porn 
degrades mission critical 
exchanges 
Interception Attacker gains access to information 
or assets used in the system 
1. Keylogger 
2. SQL injection 
3. Crypto key theft 
4. Man-in-middle attacks 
5. Knowledge of component or 
process that is meant to be secret 
 
  
Figure 3 - Typical level of detail in CSG cyber models 
The original implementation of CSG was used to repre-
sent a fully-observable, probabilistic outcome, zero-sum 
game for assessing the employment of static defenses. For 
the purposes of supporting our work on online planning, 
CSG has been modified to support the ability to interleave 
attacker/defender moves within a single game simulation, 
playing forward to some outcome where either the attacker 
succeeds in creating a mission impact or has been fended off 
by the defender. 
Online Planning for Automated Cyber Defense 
Our previous analysis of the optimal POMDP solutions for 
even simplified cyber security problems showed how 
quickly the decisions the defender must make become too 
complex for humans to easily develop on their own. This 
underscores the need to automate these decisions and find 
good approximate solutions to large-scale POMDPs in real 
time. Our work on Automated Reasoning about Cyber Re-
sponse (ARCR) is a step toward addressing that need by 
combining the capabilities of CSG with an online planner. 
We used the Approximate POMDP Planning (APPL) 
toolkit3 to build an online planner that employs the DESPOT 
algorithm. This toolkit makes it possible to implement a cus-
tomized planner that includes problem-specific heuristic 
bounds on forward search, arbitrary representations for 
POMDP states, beliefs and observations, and a clearly de-
fined interface for our black-box simulator. 
The current implementation of our ARCR planner uses 
custom bounds to manage policy search derived from 
knowledge about the cyber problem at hand. In the micro 
network scenario, for example, we know that performance 
will be bounded from above by policies using the surgical 
responses of Rm1and Rm2 when we have perfect sensors, 
and bounded from below by policies using the RA response 
 
3 http://bigbird.comp.nus.edu.sg/pmwiki/farm/appl/ 
when we have useless sensors. Note that one of the ad-
vantages of having CSG available as our simulator is that 
we can run it offline to estimate heuristic bounds for the 
planner when the problem is too complex to derive the 
bounds we need directly. Because most real-world compu-
ting networks are relatively flat, deep lookaheads are not 
needed to generate these estimates. Cybersecurity attack 
trees tend to be broad, rather than deep, so a response policy 
heuristic that favors simple short response strategies over 
complex long ones is likely to be effective, even if the strat-
egies are not always optimal. Our future work will explore 
how well these hypothesized heuristic bounds work in prac-
tice. 
Because cyber problems involve events at multiple time 
scales, the ARCR planner uses macro-actions (He, et al., 
2011) to make long multi-step lookahead searches more ef-
ficient. We have implemented what we call “discrete event” 
macro-actions which replace sequences of primitive steps 
where the attacker is idle with a single lookahead step whose 
expected reward is calculated analytically. These macro-ac-
tions provide a significant speed-up in planner performance.  
Sensor noise can make the game tree searches in CSG in-
tractable by greatly increasing the branching factor, just as 
it can make the forward search of belief states intractable in 
the planner. Since the planner already includes heuristics 
and bounds to manage the complexity of the search, we de-
cided to implement the sensor models in the planner. Our 
sensor model implementation exploits the assumption that 
sensor error events are independent to compute the observa-
tions required on each planning step efficiently. 
Our current work is applying the ARCR planner to more 
realistic cyber defense problems that involve several DIM-
FUI effects. Figure 4 shows a simple use case involving an 
information fusion mission. Business transaction agents (not 
shown) generate Sales and Inventory files that are placed in 
File Shares A and B respectively being served from Server 
Figure 4 - A simple use case illustrating an information 
fusion mission 
1. A client agent accesses paired Sales and Inventory files, 
performs some (unspecified) fusion operation on them and 
produces a combined status update file as an output, which 
is placed in Shared Folder C being served on Server 2. It is 
presumed that there is mission value to generating the com-
bined status files in a timely fashion, while maintaining their 
integrity and confidentiality. 
In our initial experiments with this use case, we modeled 
a persistent attacker with a greedy strategy who causes im-
pact as soon as possible. The attacker steals a user credential 
on its foothold, then uses that credential to move laterally 
from the foothold to Server 1. Once on Server 1, the attacker 
modifies the file share and modifies one (or more) files on 
the file share, thereby causing adverse impact to the mission. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Interaction between attacker and defender when de-
fender can disable accounts 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the interaction between the attacker’s 
actions, the associated DIMFUI effects, and the defensive 
responses generated by the ARCR planner. Assuming the 
available sensors do not detect the stolen credentials but do 
detect the lateral move, the easiest response is to eject the 
attacker and prevent impact by restoring the host with RX. 
While this response defends against the attack, it does not 
eliminate the threat and the attacker can simply go after the 
host again. 
If the defender is provided with an action that can disable 
a user account (DA), the planner can determine that the DA 
action completely blocks the attacker from doing any dam-
age and is therefore the preferred solution (assuming that 
disabling accounts is not too costly). This defensive re-
sponse is illustrated in Figure 6 . 
We are currently investigating how the defensive policy 
changes given different assumptions about what the sensors 
can detect, how reliable the sensors are, and how variations 
in vulnerabilities and credential use affect the attack paths. 
Summary 
Future cyber-attackers are likely to increasingly exploit ad-
vances in AI to achieve faster, stealthier, and more effective 
operational effects. Many of these effects will be achieved 
at a speed and scale that makes a human-in-the-loop defense 
paradigm unlikely to be effective. Consequently, future sys-
tems will have to rely to some extent on automated reason-
ing and automated responses – with humans on the loop or 
out of the loop – to ensure mission success and continuously 
adapt to an evolving adversary. 
This paper describes research suggesting that it is feasible 
to address this challenge by using decision-theoretic tech-
niques to build an automated, rational AI agent that can 
work with human analysts to achieve shared goals in uncer-
tain situations where the system mission is at risk. Decision-
theoretic approaches can represent the way a human opera-
tor understands the system, the adversary, and the mission; 
and generate responses that are aligned with risk-aware 
cost/benefit tradeoffs defined by user-supplied preferences. 
The result is an automated AI agent that is well-suited to fill 
the role of a dependable and trustworthy partner for human 
operators. 
Our work on Automated Reasoning about Cyber Re-
sponse (ARCR) has taken several successful steps in this di-
rection. By framing the cyber response problem as a 
POMDP, we bring together state-of-the-art techniques for 
anytime online planning in large state spaces with the capa-
bilities for modeling cyber security problems found in the 
Cyber Security Game (CSG). This combination appears to 
be a promising path toward computing tractable solutions to 
complex cyber security problems. Human operators could 
delegate responsibility for some aspects of cyber defense 
completely to automated responses computed in this way; 
or, they could use automated responses to buy time and limit 
loss/damage while analysts assess the situation and consider 
their options. 
As noted previously, three attributes of an automated 
agent are particularly important regarding the issues of de-
pendability and building trust with human operators: pur-
pose, process, and performance. The decision-theoretic 
Figure 5 - Interaction between attacker and defender 
when the lateral move is detected 
underpinnings in the ARCR planner and CSG provide a use-
ful starting point for establishing strong capabilities address-
ing each of these attributes. 
CSG was designed to assess mission risk in cyber security 
systems. It’s explicit representation of the mission goals, 
and the use of DIMFUI events as an abstraction for charac-
terizing mission-relevant outcomes, provide a useful way 
for humans to express their intentions. The same represen-
tations also allow us to align ARCR’s behavior with those 
intentions to establish a shared sense of purpose. 
Several factors that control the behavior of CSG and the 
ARCR planner are exposed to help make the decision-mak-
ing process more transparent to the user. In addition to 
providing their mission-related preferences and utilities, hu-
mans can specify prior beliefs about system state, custom-
ized macro-actions indicating preferred/required policies or 
standard operating procedures for various conditions, and 
heuristic guidance constraining the solutions to be consid-
ered. 
Finally, the performance of the ARCR system – in terms 
of competence, reliability, and predictability – is well char-
acterized because actions are derived from rational deci-
sions made in accordance with decision-theoretic principles. 
Our future work will focus on expanding these capabili-
ties and making them more efficient. Ongoing work in-
cludes the addition of state abstraction hierarchies to im-
prove the scaling properties of the POMDP solution approx-
imations. Other ongoing work will increase the realism of 
our cyber models by adding more sensors (including the de-
tection of both action and state), adding more attacker and 
defender actions, and reasoning about the impacts from mul-
tiple incident effects. 
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